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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

vs.

Case No. 20010812-CA

DAMON R. MUNFORD,
Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(e), (j) (2002) and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (2002).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Issue. Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's conviction for murder?
Standard of Review.

A defendant bears "an extremely heavy burden" when

challenging a jury verdict based on the sufficiency of the evidence. Julian v. State, 2002 UT
61, U 16, 52 P.3d 1168. This Court will not reverse a jury verdict unless "after viewing the
evidence and all inferences drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict,
the evidence 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for

which he or she was convicted." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, K 18, 10 P.3d 346 (quoting
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1212 (Utah 1993)); accord State v. 7«e//er, 2001 UT App 317,
U 18, 37 P.3d 1180. Where, as here, the sufficiency of the evidence was not challenged at
trial, defendant must also demonstrate "that the insufficiency was so obvious and
fundamental that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Holgate, 2000 UT
74, at f 17.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. 6 76-2-202 (1995)
Every person, acting with the mental state required for the commission of
an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits, requests,
commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for
such conduct.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (1995)
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if the actor:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another
and thereby causes the death of another;
(2) Murder is a first degree felony.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Summary of Proceedings
Defendant was charged by information with murder, a first degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1995). R. 2-6. Following a preliminary hearing, defendant
was bound over for trial. R. 23-25. On defendant's motion, the court severed his trial from
the trial of his co-defendant John Kiriluk. R. 38-41, 53. A jury found defendant guilty as
charged after a two-day trial. R. 112,204-05. Defendant was sentenced to a prison term of
five-years-to-life and ordered to pay a $ 1,000 fine plus surcharges and restitution of $ 1,600
to the victim's family. R. 116.
More than two years after sentencing, defendant filed a pro se motion requesting that
he be resentenced on the ground that his counsel failed to pursue an appeal as requested. R.
125-28. The trial court denied defendant's motion and defendant appealed. R. 129-30,13334. On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing
to enable defendant to perfect his appeal as of right. R. 162. The trial court thereafter
resentenced defendant and defendant timely appealed to the Supreme Court. R. 173-76. The
appeal was transferred to this Court for disposition. R. 190-91.
After the parties submitted briefs on appeal, counsel for defendant withdrew. On
substitute counsel's motion, this Court struck the briefs and substitute counsel submitted a
new brief. See record of Court of Appeals.
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Summary of Facts1
On March 22, 1996, the body of 23-year-old Michael Brown was found under a lone
cedar tree in a remote location in the foothills near Bluffdale. See R. 204: 82, 196-98.
Brown had suffered a black eye, a lost tooth, two blows to the back of his head, and a gaping
laceration across his neck. R. 204: 200,204; R. 205: 22-24. Two blood-spattered rocks, the
size of a man's fist and larger, were found lying six feet above Brown's head. R. 204: 20203. An autopsy revealed that Brown's death was the result of the laceration to Brown's
neck, which severed his jugular vein. R. 205: 27-31. Also contributing to Brown's death
were the two blows to his head, which fractured his skull, caused some bruising to the brain,
and precipitated a hematoma. R. 205: 24-25, 30-31.
* * *

Mike Brown was a fairly big young man, standing six feet tall and weighing almost
200 pounds. R. 205:20; see also R. 204: 82. Brown, however, was challenged mentally and
socially, functioning at the level of a 12- to 16-year-old. R. 204: 82, 110. Despite his size,
Brown was "easy-going," "quiet," and even "passive" and "timid." R. 204: 82, 110.
Unfortunately, Brown became involved with John Kiriluk, who was involved in the
methamphetamine business. See R. 204: 98, 143, 167; R. 205: 11-13. Although Kiriluk

The facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. See State v.
Brown, 948 P.2d 337,339,343 (Utah 1997); accord State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, H I
n.2,127,61 P.3d291.
4

appeared to befriend Brown, he treated him more "like [his] slave." R. 204: 95-96, 103-04,
110. Kiriluk, and those associated with him, called Brown, "Thumper." R. 204: 96, 110.
Missing P2
Sometime in late February or early March 1996, Kiriluk acquired some P2, a chemical
used in manufacturing methamphetamine. R. 204: 111-12. He paid $100 down, with the
remaining $500 to be paid at a later date. R. 204: 112. Kiriluk gave the P2 to Brown with
instructions that it be delivered to an acquaintance of Brown named Hoge, who was to
manufacture methamphetamine for Kiriluk. R. 204: 97-98, 111-12, 166-67. At about this
same time, defendant and his wife Rebecca Munford struck up a friendship with Kiriluk. R.
204: 164. Defendant became Kiriluk's "backup, his tough guy." R. 204: 109.
When the methamphetamine was not delivered as expected, Kiriluk feared that he
would never receive it and that he would thus be unable to pay for the P2. See R. 204: 9899, 112, 140-41. He went to Hoge's house looking for Hoge and the chemicals, but could
find neither. See R. 204: 112. He became extremely upset with Brown, suspecting that he
had stolen the P2. R. 204: 96, 111. Speaking with defendant two weeks before Brown's
death, Kiriluk declared that he was going to kill Brown because of the missing P2. See R.
204: 96-97, 104-05, 110-11, 141, 167.
Terrorizing the Victim
On March 21,1996, Kiriluk, his girlfriend Chablis Scott, and the Munfords gathered
at Kiriluk's apartment and used methamphetamine. R. 204: 96-97, 113, 143, 168. That
afternoon, the conversation turned to Brown and the missing P2. R. 204: 166,168. Kiriluk
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decided to go to Brown's house, bring him back to the apartment, and find out where the P2
or methamphetamine was located. R. 204: 168. Before leaving, Kiriluk told his girlfriend to
put a plastic garbage bag on the floor of his bedroom and to place a chair over the bag. R.
204: 116, 170. Defendant agreed to be Kiriluk's "backup muscle" and drove Kiriluk to
Brown's home in Sandy. R. 204: 82-83, 86-87, 113, 141, 165, 168.
Kiriluk and defendant talked with Brown at his house for about ten minutes before
taking him back to Kiriluk's apartment. R. 204: 83-84, 114, 142. Once back at the
apartment, Kiriluk and defendant berated Brown over the missing drugs. R. 204: 114-15,
142; see also R. 204: 169-70, 188. Kiriluk pressed Brown for Hoge's whereabouts and
asked why Hoge was hiding from them, but to no avail. See R. 204: 114-17, 142. The
interrogation began in the living room before moving to the bedroom where Brown was
made to sit in the chair that had been placed there by Kiriluk's girlfriend. See R. 204: 11416,142,170. Defendant exited the bedroom after 10 to 15 miinutes, and a few minutes later,
Kiriluk punched Brown in the face so hard that it knocked out one of Brown's teeth. R. 204:
117-18, 142-43,171.
The Murder
After nearly an hour at the apartment, the group piled into Rebecca Munford's truck.
R. 204: 100,119,171-72. Rebecca Munford drove, with Chablis Scott in the passenger seat
and the three men in the back of the truck. R. 204: 100,119,171-72. Although Kiriluk had
told his girlfriend they were going to Hoge's house in Riverton, he told his roommate, who
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stopped to talk to him before they left, that they were going to play pool. R. 204: 100, 11920, 158, 172-73. They did neither.
As Rebecca Munford approached Hoge's neighborhood, she asked which way she
should turn. R. 204: 120. Instead of telling her to turn right towards Hoge's house,
defendant put his hand through the cab window and told her to go left up to the foothills. R.
204: 120-21. Heeding her husband's directions, she turned left and drove up into the
foothills. R. 204: 121. After driving to the water treatment plant, she turned onto a dirt road,
stopping about a half mile up the road. R. 204: \2\;see R. 204: 174, 197-98. Kiriluk and
defendant left the truck momentarily, and upon their return, defendant told his wife to
continue further up the road. R. 204: 121,174. She drove another half mile before stopping
again. R. 204: 121-22; see R. 204: 174, 197-98.
After stopping a second time, Kiriluk and defendant hopped out of the truck and
spoke with defendant's wife. R. 204: 122. Rebecca Munford turned to Chablis Scott,
handed her a knife that she kept in her purse, and told her to give it to the men. See R. 204:
124, 151-52. Then, while Kiriluk retrieved Brown from the back of the truck, defendant
hugged his wife and told her that he loved her. R. 204: 123, 176-78. When the two men
began to walk away with Brown, Scott called them back because they had forgotten the
knife. R. 204: 124, 126, 152. After retrieving the knife, the two men escorted Brown over
the hill and out ofsight to a lone cedar tree. R. 204: 123,127,156,178-79; seeR. 204: 198.
Ten minutes later, defendant and Kiriluk returned to the truck without Brown. R. 204: 128,
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180. After the four piled back into the truck, defendant announced/it's done/1 R. 204: 129.
Rebecca Munford replied, "Good. Let's go." R. 204: 129.
As defendant drove the truck back down the road, he excitedly exclaimed that he had
"enjoyed the thrill." R. 204: 130-31. After stopping at the water treatment plant to change
drivers, the group returned to Kiriluk's apartment where they disposed of the personal
belongings which had been taken from Brown. R. 204: 88, 132-36, 180, 183-85. Kiriluk
washed the blood off the knife and returned it to defendant's wife. See R. 204: 182-83.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Where defendant did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at trial, he must
demonstrate plain error. A review of the record reveals that the evidence was more than
sufficient to support defendant's conviction. The evidence established that defendant acted
as John Kiriluk's strong man on the day of the murder, directed the participants to the
murder site, physically escorted the victim to the place where he was killed, participated in
the murder itself, and acknowledged his willing participation in the murder. Defendant has
therefore shown no error, much less plain error. Because the evidence was sufficient to
support the conviction, defendant's ineffective assistance claim for counsel's failure to move
for a directed verdict also fails.
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ARGUMENT
A.

T H E TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SUBMITTED THE CASE TO THE JURY.

"[A]s a general rule, a defendant must raise the sufficiency of the evidence by proper
motion or objection [at trial] to preserve the issue for appeal." State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74,
11 16, 10 P.3d 346. An appellate court will reverse a jury conviction based on an
unpreserved insufficiency claim only if the defendant demonstrates that the trial court plainly
erred in submitting the case to the jury. Id. at ^j 11, 17. "[T]o establish plain error, a
defendant must demonstrate first that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of
the crime charged and second that the insufficiency was so obvious and fundamental that the
trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. at^j 17. Because defendant did not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at trial below, see R. 205: 41-46, 77, 87, he must
show plain error. He has not met that burden.
1. Accomplice Liability.
Under Utah's homicide statute, a person commits murder if he or she:
(a) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another commits an act
clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another; [or]
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to
human life engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another
and thereby causes the death of another.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(1 )(a)-(c) (1996). A person who does not directly cause the
death of another may likewise be found guilty of murder as an accomplice if "acting with the
mental state required for the commission of [murder]," he or she "solicits, requests,
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commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person" in committing the murder.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1995). In other words, a person is criminally liable for a crime
if he or she "knowingly associates with the unlawful venture and participates in a way which
indicates that such person is furthering the success of the venture/' State v. Williams, 229
Kan. 646, 661, 630 P.2d 694, 706 (Kan. 1981).
To be found guilty as an accomplice, "something more than a defendant's passive
presence during the planning and commission of a crime is required . . . . There must be
evidence showing that the defendant engaged in some active behavior, or at least speech or
other expression, that served to assist or encourage the primary perpetrators in committing
the crime;' State ex rel V. T., 2000 UT App 189, % 16,5 P.3d 1234; accord State v. Kerekes,
622 P.2d 1161,1166 (Utah 1980) (holding that "[m]ere presence, or even prior knowledge,
does not make one an accomplice when he neither advises, instigates, encourages, or assists
in perpetration of the crime"). That said, presence during the planning and commission of a
crime is often a predicate to complicity.
As with any crime, "a finding of accomplice liability can be properly based on
circumstantial evidence." V.T., 2000 UT App 189, at^ 18 n.8. Accordingly, a defendant's
"cpresence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from
which [his or her] participation in the criminal intent may be inferred.'" American Fork City
v. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, H 7, 12 P.3d 108 (quoting Watson v. State, 214 Ga.App. 645,
448 S.E.2d 752, 753 (Ga. 1994)) (citations omitted). "[Otherwise innocent act[s] of
'relatively slight moment,' may, when viewed in the context of surrounding circumstances,
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justify an inference of complicity

" United States v. Randall, 491 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th

Cir. 1974).
2. The Evidence Was Sufficient to Sustain Defendant's Murder
Conviction.
Citing State v. Labrum, 959 P.2d 120 (Utah App. 1998), cert, denied, 982 P.2d 88
(Utah 1999), and State ex. rel V.T., 2000 UT App 189, 5 P.3d 1234, defendant argues that
the State proved only that he was present during the murder, but nothing more. Aplt. Brf. at
15-16. Indeed, the evidence that defendant was present during the murder of Michael Brown
was uncontradicted. See Aplt. Brf. at f 17. Both Chablis Scott and defendant's wife
Rebecca testified that on the night of the murder, the three men walked down the hill and out
of sight at the desolate location near Bluffdale and that only defendant and Kiriluk returned
to the truck. R. 204: 123, 127-29, 156, 178-80. However, unlike Labrum and V.T., the
evidence of defendant's complicity was not limited to a showing that he was present during
the crime.
In Labrum, the evidence established that the accused accomplice was present when
the shooting was planned and when the shooting occurred, but nothing suggested that he in
any way contributed to the planning or facilitated the shooting. 959 P.2d at 121. At best, the
State showed that he approved of the shooting by gloating nonverbally afterwards. Id. at
121-22. In V.T.j the defendant was present when his two friends took a camcorder from a
relative's house and when one of the friends later sold it at a pawn shop. 2000 UT App 189,
atffl[2-5. However, "there [was] no indication in the record that V.T. had instigated, incited
to action, emboldened, helped, or advised the other two boys in planning or committing the
11

theft." Id, aH[ 18. In contrast to Labrum and V.T., the evidence introduced in this case
established that defendant was not merely present during the murder, but that he intentionally
"assisted] in [the] perpetration of the crime." See Kerekes, 622 P.2d at 1166.
(a) The Evidence Established That Defendant Acted as Kiriluk's Strong
Man.
Kiriluk was in the methamphetamine business. See R. 204: 98,143,167; R. 205: 1113. Kiriluk's roommate, Chance Penrod, testified that defendant was Kiriluk's "buddy" and
"partner" and Kiriluk's girlfriend, Chablis Scott, described defendant as Kiriluk's "backup,
his tough guy." R. 204: 109. In other words, defendant was not simply Kiriluk's friend, but
his partner in crime, providing the "muscle" in his drug dealings.
The evidence established that defendant was acting as Kiriluk's strong man in his
dealings with Brown on the day of the murder. Defendant's wife Rebecca testified that on
the night of the murder, Kiriluk specifically asked defendant "to be backup muscle for him."
R. 204: 165. The evidence established that defendant perfoirmed that role. When Kiriluk
decided to get Brown that afternoon, defendant drove him to Brown's house. R. 204: 82-83,
86-87, 113, 141,165, 168. After picking up Brown, c/e/ewc/a^f drove back to the apartment
where both defendant and Kiriluk berated Brown over the missing chemicals. R. 204: 82-84,
114-16, 142; see also R. 204: 169-70, 188. When Brown did not provide them with a
satisfactory response, both men took him into the bedroom and continued the interrogation.
R.204: 116,142,170.
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(b) The Evidence Established That Defendant Assisted Kiriluk in
Accomplishing the Murder.
When the two men were unable to coerce a satisfactory response from Brown, they
took him up to the foothills. Contrary to his claim on appeal, see Aplt. Brf. at 18,
defendant's conduct demonstrated that he was much more than a passive witness to the
crime. As they approached the neighborhood where Hoge lived, defendant directed his wife
to drive up into the hills (rather than to the house where they feigned to be going). R. 204:
120-21} After stopping momentarily about a half mile up the road, defendant again directed
his wife to drive further up the road. See R. 204: 121,174,197-98. After stopping a second
time, defendant, together with Kiriluk, escorted Brown over the hill to a lone Cedar tree. R.
204:123,126,152. Defendant did not passively walk along, but physically held on to Brown
as they walked. R. 204:123. In other words, defendant forcefully escorted Brown to the site
of his impending murder.
The evidence further suggests that defendant may have directly participated in the
murder. In addition to the laceration across his throat, Brown suffered two blunt force
injuries to the back of his head that contributed to his death. R. 205: 22-25, 30-31. The
medical examiner testified that these injuries likely occurred before the neck laceration, that
a "fairly sizeable force" would have been required to produce the injuries, and that the two

2

Although Rebecca Munford testified that it was Kiriluk who directed her to turn
toward the foothills, R. 204: 173, rather than defendant as testified to by Chablis Scott, R.
204: 120, the appellate court "assume[s] that the jury believed the evidence supporting the
verdict." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1213 (Utah 1993).
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blood-spattered rocks found next to Brown's body could have produced the injuries. R. 2(>5:
24-25, 30. Given defendant's role as Kiriluk's strong man, the jury could reasonably
conclude that although Kiriluk may have cut Brown's throat/ defendant also participated in
the murder by hitting Brown in the back of the head with the rocks or by shoving him
backwards, causing him to fall and hit his head against the rocks.4
(c) The Evidence Established That Defendant Knowingly Participated or
Otherwise Assisted in the Murder.
The conduct of the parties in the hours and moments preceding the murder supports a
finding that defendant intended to assist in the murder of Brown that night. For instance, just
before the group left in the truck, Kiriluk told his roommate, in defendant's presence, that
they were going to play pool. R. 204: 100. No one among the four believed they were going
to play pool, not even Chablis Scott. SeeR. 204: 119. Defendant did not correct Kiriluk, but
played along with the ruse. And rather than directing his wife to drive to a home, defendant
instructed her to drive up into the hills. R. 204: 120-21.
Chablis Scott testified that after they stopped on the dirt road a second time, Kiriluk
and defendant exited the truck bed and spoke with defendant's wife Rebecca. R. 204: 122.
Rebecca Munford turned to Scott, handed her a knife, and told her to give it to the two men.
See R. 204: 124, 152. When Kiriluk and defendant began escorting Brown away, Scott

J

Because only Kiriluk's fingerprints were found on the knife, see R. 204: 215, the
evidence seems to suggest that Kiriluk cut Brown's throat with the knife.
4

The medical examiner conceded that an unbroken fall may be the more likely cause
of the head injuries due to their nature and location, but also testified that he observed
injuries to the head that were more consistent with a blow to the head. R. 205: 22-24,33-36.
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called them back because they had forgotten the knife. R. 204: 124, 126-27, 151-52. From
that testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant was well aware of the plan to
kill Brown and intentionally assisted Kiriluk in carrying out that plan. Defendant's behavior
immediately after the discussion buttresses that inference. Before escorting Brown down the
hill, defendant hugged his wife and told her that he loved her. R. 204: 123, 176, 178. This
otherwise innocent gesture, when considered in light of the circumstances, reasonably
suggests that defendant was seeking reassurance and support from his wife because he knew
what they were about to do. See Randall, 491 F.2d at 1320 (observing that "otherwise
innocent act[s] of 'relatively slight moment,' may, when viewed in the context of
surrounding circumstances, justify an inference of complicity").
Finally, defendant's murderous intent was betrayed by his remarks following the
murder. When the two men returned without Brown, defendant announced, "It's done? to
which his wife coldly replied, "Good. Let's go." R. 204: 129 (emphasis added). Had the
murder come as a surprise to defendant, he would have explained to his wife what had
occurred. He did not, but simply declared that it was "done." R. 204: 129. That simple
declaration would only have been made had he, and his wife, known of the murder plan. The
jury could therefore reasonably conclude that defendant intentionally "assistfed] in [the]
perpetration of the crime," Kerekes, 622 P.2d at 1166.
Defendant's direct and knowing participation in the killing was also revealed by his
remarks as they left the scene. On the way down to the water treatment plant, defendant
exclaimed that he "enjoyed the thrill? R. 204: 130-31 (emphasis added). Again, the jury
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could reasonably infer that defendant was referring to the murder—that he "enjo>ed the
thrill" of killing Brown. That statement strongly suggests that defendant not only assisted in
the murder by escorting Brown over the hill, but that he participated in the murder itself
* * *

In summary, it cannot be said that the evidence of defendant's participation in the
murder was '"sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable such that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime for which
h e . . . was convicted.'" See Holgate, 2000 UT 74, atf 18 (quotingDunn, 850 P.2d at 1212).
Certainly, it cannot be said that "the State presented] no evidence" establishing defendant's
participation or that the claimed insufficiency was otherwise "so obvious and fundamental
that the trial court erred in submitting the case to the jury." Id. at^J 17 (emphasis in original).
Accordingly, defendant's insufficiency claim fails.
B.

DEFENSE COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE IN NOT MOVING FOR A
DIRECTED VERDICT.

In point II of his brief, defendant argues that his attorney's failure to move for a
directed verdict for insufficient evidence constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Aplt.
Brf. at 19. Because the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury verdict and any motion
would have therefore been pointless, counsel was not ineffective in deciding not to move for
a directed verdict. See State v. Wallace, 2002 UT App 295, \ 22, 55 P.3d 1147 (holding that
failure to make futile motions does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted April 2, 2003.
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